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Addis: Strangers to the Constitution?: Resident Aliens, Military Tribun

Lecture
STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION?:
RESIDENT ALIENS, MILITARY TRIBUNALS,
AND THE LAWS OF WAR
Adeno Addis*
1.
In 1996, Gerald Neuman of Columbia Law School wrote a book
entitled Strangers to the Constitution, from which I gratefully borrow the
title of my talk today. Neuman began the book with this question: "The
Constitution begins with 'We the People.' Where does it end?"1 It is
obvious how the Constitution ends literally, with the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment or, if one were to be more proper, with Article VII.
Of course, we know that the question was not meant to elicit a literal
answer. Neuman was not asking about what the last words of the
Constitution were. Rather, his was a fundamental question: who is
included in the phrase "We the People"?
To whom does the
Constitution speak? One could say that a great deal of constitutional
jurisprudence is an attempt to supply answers to this simple question.
Different answers have been given at different times. There was a time
when people of certain ethnic and racial origin were deemed not to be
part of "We the People." 2 And for a long while women were not to be

*

W. Ray Forrester Professor of Public and Constitutional Law, Tulane Law School.

This lecture was given as the Third Annual Indiana Supreme Court Lecture at Valparaiso
University School of Law on October 24, 2002. I thank the Dean and members of the law
school community for their generous hospitality during my visit and for the many
wonderful conversations that I had with them.
1 GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS AND
FUNDAMENTAL LAW 3 (1996).
2
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; id. art. I, § 9, cl. 1; id. art. IV, § 2, cl.
3; see also Dred Scott
v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404 (1857). Chief Justice Roger Taney, the author of that infamous
decision, concluded in that case that the phrase "We the People of the United States" and
the various references to "persons" were to be understood as synonymous with "citizens."
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 404. For Taney, this implied that even a free black could never be a
citizen of the United States, for blacks were not viewed as part of "We the People" when
the Constitution was framed. Id. at 404-05. It took three-quarters of a century and a
destructive civil war before the phrase "We the People" was thought to include people of
African descent, at least formally. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.

627
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2003

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 2 [2003], Art. 4

628

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW

[Vol.37

qualified members of "We the People." 3 We no longer think that way, at
least not formally. But these two examples indicate three important
general propositions. First, the history of "We the People" has been one
of tension: the tension between America's commitment to a community
of equals, on the one hand, and a deep-seated desire to exclude certain
groups from the privilege of full membership on the other. It is this
tension that has defined the development of "We the People." Second,
the development of "We the People" has generally been in the direction
of more inclusiveness, although with some zigzags. Third, it is the
mobilized efforts of successive generations that have enabled or forced
us to reconceive the nature of the community that is embodied in the
phrase "We the People."
There is something else that we might note about the phrase "We the
People." As Alexander Bickel observed long ago, the Constitution starts
with the phrase "We the People," not "We the Citizens," as it could
have.4 This suggests that the community that is the primary focus of the
Constitution is the people-citizens and noncitizens alike within the
geographic limit of what we call the United States or territories that are
subject to the authority of the United States. Justice John Marshall
Harlan expressed this position in a powerful dissent at the turn of the
twentieth century when he said, "The Constitution speaks ... to all
peoples, whether of States or territories, who are subject to the authority
5
of the United States."
To be sure, the Constitution conceives of many subcommunities for
specific purposes and roles within the larger community of "We the
People." But when that is the case, the Constitution specifically says so.
Thus, only citizens are to be members of Congress, 6 and only the rights

It took a century and a half before women were constitutionally guaranteed the right
to vote. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. For the evolution of the formal full inclusion of
women in the community of "We the People," see JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN
3

CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION (1991). See also ROGERS SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS:
CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 311-17 (1997).
4
ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 36 (1975). Indeed, Bickel makes the

claim that "the concept of citizenship plays only the most minimal role in American
constitutional scheme." Id. at 33.
5
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 378 (1901) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
6
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring members of the House of Representative to have
been U.S. citizens for seven years); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (requiring senators to be U.S. citizens
for nine years).
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of citizens to vote are protected, 7 though there is no prohibition on
enfranchising noncitizens.
In fact, "[dluring the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries [many] states and territories enfranchised
immigrants in both state and federal elections." 8 The Constitution
creates an even smaller category of "We the People" for certain roles.
For example, only a natural born citizen can be President of the United
States. 9
From these specific constitutional limitations, one could
reasonably infer that formal participation in the political realm assumes
a community of citizens. But that has to be viewed as a special case, as
an exception to the general community of "the People," to which the
Constitution refers numerous times, 10 and which seems to be its primary
concern.
II.
In this lecture, I want to consider an answer President George W.
Bush gave on November 13, 2001, albeit indirectly, to the question of
who is included in the community of "We the People." On that day, the
President issued a military order authorizing the establishment of
military commissions (tribunals)1 for the purpose of trying people
accused of terrorism, of harboring terrorists, or of being members of a
terrorist organization such as al Qaida.12 Such individuals were to be
tried for "violations of the law of war and other applicable laws." 13 The

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; id. amends. XV, XIX, XXVI. Of course, this means that
enfranchisement of permanent residents is a permissible option. Some have argued that
the Constitution actually requires enfranchisement. See Gerald M. Rosberg, Aliens and
Equal Protection: MiAqy
Not the Right to Vote?, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1092 (1977). However, I
believe this is a harder position to defend.
8
Jennifer Gordon, Let Them Vote, in A COMMUNITY OF EQUALS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTION OF NEW AMERICANS 43 (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 1999). Not only is
enfranchising immigrants not prohibited by the Constitution, but doing so will, in my
view, be normatively desirable. To the extent that permanent residents are required to
shoulder most, if not all, of the social responsibilities that citizens are required to shoulder
(such as pay taxes and defend the United States), it would be inconsistent with any
reasonable understanding of democracy to exclude them from having a say in how the
government that requires them to shoulder those burdens is constituted.
9
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4 (requiring that the President be a natural born citizen).
10 See U.S. CONST. amends. I, I, IV (referring to the "right of the people"); id. art. I, § 9, cl.
8; id. art. III, § 3, cl. 1; id. art. IV, § 2; id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3; see also id. amend. V; id. amend. XV,
§§ 1, 3 (referring to right of "persons").
11 I shall use "commissions" and "tribunals" interchangeably.
12
Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain NonCitizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, § 2 (Nov. 13, 2001) [hereinafter
Military Order].
7

13

Id. § 1(e).
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Order was adopted in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the United
States two months earlier, on September 11, 2001.
The Military Order was sweeping in its reach and was immediately
subjected to fierce criticism that came from across the political
spectrum. 14 It is a rare day in Washington when Democratic Senator
Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts and William Safire, the conservative
New York Times columnist, agree on matters of politics.1 5 Or when the
Democratic Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Patrick
Leahy of Vermont, and Republican Representative Robert Barr of
Georgia see eye-to-eye politically. Yet, the Military Order brought that
about. Each opposed the Military Order to one degree or another.
The critics of the Order could be grouped into three categories: the
institutionalists, the proceduralists, and the internationalists. The first
group of critics, the group advocating the institutionalist critique, faults
the Order because it undermines an important aspect of American legal
culture-checks and balances. The President and his advisors make the
law and the regulations under which the accused are to be tried. They
determine who is to be subject to tribunal jurisdiction. They decide
whether or not to prosecute and what procedural and evidentiary
safeguards are to be afforded the accused. The President, not an
independent judicial tribunal, will review the decisions of the military
tribunals and appeal panels. Put simply, the complaint is that everyone
and everything in the tribunal process is subordinate to the President.
As William Safire observed: "No longer does the judicial branch and an
independent jury stand between the government and the accused. In
lieu of those checks and balances central to our legal system, the
[accused] face an executive that is now investigator, prosecutor, judge,
jury and jailer or executioner." 16 To this group of critics, the President,

This is not to say that the Order does not have its supporters. There were some that
defended the Order both on constitutional and normative grounds. See, e.g., Curtis A.
Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Constitutional Validity of Military Commissions, 5 GREEN
BAG 2d 249 (2002); Ruth Wedgwood, Al Qaeda, Terrorism, and Military Commissions; Agora:
Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 328 (2002).
15
William Safire called the adoption of the Order as something amounting "to
dictatorial power." See William Safire, Seizing DictatorialPower, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001,
at A31.
16
Id.
14
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through this Order, has simply created his own justice and prison
17
systems.
The checks and balances argument is said to have its basis either in
the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers or in the general legal
principle that, in a democratic culture, one person or group should not
be the legislator, the prosecutor, and the judge at the same time, 18 except,
of course, in an extreme emergency when other loci of legitimate power
are in no position to function properly. 19 The Constitution and our legal
culture generally distrust aggregations of power. 20 As Justice Hugo
Black once put it, "Such blending of functions in one branch of the
Government is the objectionable thing which the draftsmen of the

Defenders of the tribunals argue that the President has authorization from Congress.
See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 14. They cite both the Joint Resolution authorizing
him to use all means to pursue terrorists and some statutory provisions. Id. at 252-54. I
believe that it is a stretch to view the Joint Resolution as authorizing the establishment of
military tribunals, and there is a reasonable argument to be made that the statutory
provisions relied upon do not contemplate such authorizations.
18
It has been an accepted principle in Anglo-American law for centuries that a "person
cannot be judge in his own cause." Dr. Bonham's Case, Rep. 107a, 114a (C.P. 1610). This
principle has been said to apply to appellate as well as trial judges. See Aetna Life Ins. Co.
v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 821-25 (1986).
19
See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 121 (1866) (stating that trials before military
commissions "can never be applied to citizens ...where the courts are open and their
process unobstructed"). It is true that the court referred to "citizens" here, but that is
precisely because the facts involved citizens, nothing more. Id. at 107, 121. To the extent
that President Bush is relying on that statement for distinguishing between citizens and
noncitizens, he is misreading the case. First, the issue in that case was simply whether
military tribunals ought to be used when the courts are functioning properly, not whether
there ought to be distinction between citizens and noncitizens. Id. at 118-27. The outcome
did not turn on the status of the individuals but rather on the state of the federal courts. Id.
at 127-31. Second, to the extent that the Court did take into account the status of the
individuals, then it could be argued that the reference to citizens is not so much to citizens
in the technical sense but to all those that are members of "We the People" who were
potential targets of a military tribunal.
20
Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 335 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas
quoted Lord Acton to make the point:
I cannot accept your canon that we are to judge Pope and King unlike
other men, with a favourable presumption that they did no wrong. If
there is any presumption it is the other way against holders of power,
increasing as the power increases. Historic responsibility has to make
up for the want of legal responsibility. Power tends to corrupt and
absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great men are almost always bad
men, even when they exercise influence and not authority: still more
when you superadd the tendency or the certainty of corruption by
authority.
17
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Constitution endeavored to prevent by providing for the separation of
21
governmental powers."
The second group makes a proceduralist argument. Even if the
establishment of tribunals could be institutionally justified, the way they
are organized will likely result in the miscarriage of justice. Most of the
trials are likely to be conducted in secret.22 Secret trials often breed
injustice. 23 Hearsay evidence, perhaps even double and triple hearsay, is
admitted. There is no requirement that there be unanimity to convict. 24
For this group of critics, it is not the establishment of tribunals per se that
is worrisome but rather the rules under which they are meant to function
and the consequences that are likely to follow from this.
The third group, one that I shall refer to as the internationalists,
worries that a decision rendered by a military tribunal would not enjoy
legitimacy in the wider international community, the cooperation of
which the United States needs if it were to defeat terrorism. The
internationalists argue that the legitimacy gap could have two
consequences. First, other countries may be reluctant to extradite to the
United States those who are suspected of involvement in the September
11th or other terrorist attacks. Indeed, some countries have already
expressed their reluctance to send suspected terrorists to the United
States to stand trial if the only avenue is to be a military tribunal. 25
Second, the legitimacy deficit could also affect the capacity of the United
States to lead worldwide in the defense of human rights. It will be
harder to complain with any degree of persuasiveness to countries such
as Egypt and Peru, countries that the United States has at one time or
another criticized for using military tribunals to try civilians, that those

21 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 39 (1957) (plurality opinion).
22 The regulations say they will, however, be open as much as practicable.
2
CBC News Online, U.S. Senate Debates Use of Military Tribunals (Nov. 28, 2001), at
http://www.cbc.ca/storyview/ CBC/2001/11/28/tribunals_011128 (last visited Mar. 30,
2003). The Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Patrick Leahy of
Vermont, made this point at a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing where Assistant
Attorney General Mike Chertoff defended the appropriateness of secret military tribunals.
Id. Senator Leahy observed: "It's clear that secret trials [,which such tribunals would
entail,] can breed injustice and taint the legitimacy of the verdicts." Id.
24 The regulations now require unanimity for the death penalty.
Z5 The European Parliament representing the fifteen members of the European Union
adopted a resolution "emphatically declar[ing] that extradition from the EU to the United
States cannot be allowed for people who could be sentenced to death or who are to be tried
by military tribunals." Charles V. Pena, Blowback: The Unintended Consequences of Military
Tribunals, 16 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHIcS & POL'Y 119, 122 (2002) (citation omitted).
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accused of supporting terrorist groups should be tried in an open court
26
rather than before military tribunals.
Like any attempt to group people into distinct and neat categories,
putting the critics of the Military Order and of the proposed tribunals
into three categories has its reductive dimension. It underplays the
possibility that there may be an overlap among the position of the three
groups, the possibility that an individual critic may be committed to all
three positions, or the fact that the category may be under or over
inclusive and the like.
In whatever way one categorizes the critics of President Bush's
Order, because of their preoccupation with the general issue of military
tribunals, not many have started to focus on specific issues raised by the
Military Order. The focus of the critics has been, by and large, on what
The
shall be referred to as the pitfall of dual iinilateralism.
worry
about
presidential
and proceduralists
institutionalists
unilateralism in the context of the constitutional scheme of government,
and the internationalists question whether the unilateralism that the
tribunals represent, vis-A-vis the rest of the world, is desirable at all.

In its annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, the State Department criticized
the use of military tribunals to try civilians for acts of terrorism. The 2000 Country Reports
on Egypt faulted the country because the "use of military ... courts ... has deprived
hundreds of civilian defendants of their constitutional right to be tried by a civilian judge."
U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, COUNTRY
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTIcEs-2000 (Feb. 23, 2001), http://www.state.gov/drl/
rls/hrrpt/2000/nea/784.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2003). "Military courts," the report
continued, "do not ensure civilian defendants due process before an independent
tribunal." Id. The State Department has also often criticized Peru for its use of military
tribunals to try civilians accused of treason and terrorism. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF STATE,
26

BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN

RIGHTS PRACTICES-2000 (Feb. 23, 2001), http://www.state.gov/gldrl/rls/hrrpt/2000/wha/
827.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2003). The 2000 Country Reports observes that the use of
military courts by Peru for terrorism "do[es] not meet internationally accepted standards of
openness, fairness, and due process." Id. When Lori Berenson, a U.S. citizen, was tried and
convicted in Peru of terrorism-related crimes by a military tribunal, State Department
spokespersons repeatedly criticized Peru for not trying Ms. Berenson in an open civilian
court in accordance with international juridical norms. See id. Similar observations were
made about Turkey, Sudan, and others. See Pena, supra note 25. Interestingly, the 2001
Country Reports on Egypt, which was the first update to the Reports after the Military Order,
does not include the criticism of Egyptian tribunals, and there is no indication for the
removal. See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTIcEs-2001 (Mar. 4, 2002), http://www.state.
gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/nea/8248.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2003).
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Rather than joining the general debate on dual unilateralism or the
constitutionality or desirability of establishing military tribunals, I shall
focus on an issue of a narrower scope, though quite central to the
President's Order. The Military Order makes a distinction between
citizens and noncitizens for purposes of tribunal jurisdiction. The
question is this: even if one were to assume that the President is within
his constitutional authority to establish military tribunals and even if one
could be persuaded that under the circumstances the establishment of
such tribunals is consistent with the best understandings of political
morality, is the Order nevertheless defective on either of those grounds
because it makes a distinction between citizens and noncitizens, making
only the latter subject to the jurisdiction of the tribunals? Put differently,
27
does the phrase "We the People" in both its constitutional and political
dimensions make it impermissible for the President to make such
distinctions?
III.
As indicated earlier, according to the Order, the military tribunals
are to have jurisdiction over noncitizens only. 28 The universe of
noncitizens that are potential targets is made up of three different
groups. One group includes all noncitizens who are arrested outside the
United States and who have no residence or any other status that links
them to the United States (Nonresident Aliens or "NRAs"). The second
group includes noncitizens who are arrested within the United States
while in the country on temporary visas (Lawful Temporary Residents or
"LTRs"), such as visitors and students. The third group includes
resident aliens (Lawful Permanent Residents or "LPRs") who may be
arrested within or outside the country.
The main focus of this lecture is the third group, LPRs, although I
shall have something to say about LTRs as well. And to a great extent,
what I say about LPRs may apply equally to LTRs. The case of NRAs is

By "political" I mean to refer to the role of political morality to define what the
community "We the People" can or cannot do to a segment or segments of its populaton.
29
Section 2(a) of the Military Order provides: "The term 'individual subject to this
order' shall mean any individual who is not a United States citizen .
Military Order,
supra note 12. According to congressional testimony, that would cover about twenty
million individuals in the United States. See Military Tribunals, 147 CONG. REC. S13275-01
(daily ed. Oct. 13, 2001).
27
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far more complicated, and it is arguable that the Constitution does not
speak to them, at least not as loudly as it does to the other two groups. 29
The Order makes no distinction among noncitizens. A permanent
resident who has adopted this country as his permanent home, but has
not yet taken up American citizenship, and who is arrested within the
United States will be subject to tribunal jurisdiction in the same way as a
nonresident alien who was arrested outside the country. It matters not
how many years an individual may have lived in the United States or
how deep or extensive his connections. It matters not that historically
admission as an LPR has constituted invitation to full membership to the
community of "We the People." And it seems to make no difference that
to be invited as an LPR is to have gone through the most rigorous
selection process. The fact that an LPR could be drafted to the armed
forces of the United States or that he is required to shoulder and
discharge almost all social responsibilities that are required of citizens,
30
such as paying taxes, will count for naught.
A permanent resident is treated by the Military Order as outside the
community of "We the People" as would persons who have never set
foot in this country or never have any inclination to make this country
their home.31 Indeed, for purposes of tribunal jurisdiction, the relevant
defining feature of "We the People" becomes whether one has taken the
formal act of acquiring citizenship rather than the quality or strength of
one's affiliation to the community.
To make the point more clearly, imagine the following. Two
individuals who happened to be friends emigrated from Canada to the
United States six years ago. One of them has just become a citizen after

29

"[Cjonstitutional

protections available to persons inside the United States are

unavailable to aliens outside our geographic borders." Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,
693 (2001). But see David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REv. 953, 983-84 (2002).
30
"Aliens like citizens pay taxes and may be called into the armed forces." Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (Blackmun, J.). justice Blackmun clearly thought that
immigrants were part of "We the People." Id. The United States Code states that "no local
board shall order for induction for training and service in the Armed Forces of the United
States an alien unless such alien shall have resided in the United States for one year." 50
U.S.C. app. § 455(a)(3) (2000). A permanent resident alien may request exemption from
military service but will lose eligibility for citizenship if the exemption is granted. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1426(a) (2000).
31
The distinction between those who have entered the country and those who have not
effected such entry is of course a constant theme of constitutional jurisprudence in this
area. As Justice Breyer wrote for the majority in Zadvydas, "once an alien enters the
country, the legal circumstance changes." Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693.
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waiting for the required five-year period. The other has not yet taken up
U.S. citizenship and remains a Canadian citizen, although he is eligible
to apply for American citizenship. The two are accused of harboring
terrorists. According to President Bush's Military Order, one of them,
the citizen, will be tried before regular federal courts with all the
protections afforded to a defendant in such a trial. The permanent
resident may be subject to the jurisdiction of military tribunals where
constitutional protections are minimal to nonexistent.
By now some of you may be saying to yourselves:
Adeno Addis, you have too much time on your hands!
Why worry about people who are determined to destroy
or at least to seriously damage us? A person whose
purpose in life is to destroy us as a people has by
definition cast himself or herself outside the community.
Indeed, such a person is the very negation of "We the
People."
This is a reasonable and understandable concern. But let me make three
observations in regard to this concern. First, if the criterion for the loss of
membership is one's desire or attempt to destroy "We the People," then
the distinction between citizen and noncitizens makes very little sense.
Surely a citizen who is accused of conspiring to injure us, or belongs to a
group that desires to destroy us, is no less a threat to "We the People"
than is the permanent resident who may be accused of similar acts. Nor
is this citizen less a negation of who we are as a people and what we
stand for than the permanent resident who is accused of similar acts.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, under the Military Order, an
individual becomes subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission simply
on the basis of allegation by the President. The point is that it is the mere
allegation by the President, more correctly by the Secretary of Defense
(and perhaps with the assistance of the Attorney General), that lands one
under the jurisdiction of the tribunal. The President, with the assistance
of the Secretary of Defense, determines who is a terrorist suspect.32 And
in these times, I am afraid there is going to be a tendency for government
officials to err on the side of wider inclusion. History teaches us that in
times of great fear and vulnerability, the exercise of unchecked power by
the Executive often tends to be grossly overinclusive, for the Executive

32

Military Order, supra note 12.
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sees its function primarily as one of ensuring the security of the nation
and, hence, to subordinate other important constitutional and civic
values to that primary concern. Indeed, courts are now finding, in
relation to people that are detained and over whom courts have
jurisdiction, that important constitutional and civic values are
subordinate to the notion of security.
Put simply, my second argument is that defending the President's
authority to subject resident aliens to a military tribunal on the account
that those individuals mean to destroy us, or to adversely affect "We the
People," simply assumes the very thing that is meant to be proven. I
find it to be extraordinary that one's constitutional protection will
diminish with the perceived likelihood of one's guilt prior to trial. This
seems utterly inconsistent with our constitutional tradition. But, that is
precisely what the Military Order does by authorizing the President to
subject an individual to the jurisdiction of a military tribunal if he has
reason to believe-and no more than that-that the accused is guilty of
the crime charged.
Third, if constitutional democracy is to live up to its promise of
treating all its members with "equal concern and respect," to borrow a
phrase from Ronald Dworkin,33 and to have a community of equals, it
must be especially vigilant about the fate of its minorities in times of
crises and strain, for it is those members that are most vulnerable in such
times. Alien residents, including permanent residents, are, in this
circumstance, the most vulnerable minority within the community. I
shall have more to say about this later.
IV.
This, of course, is not the first time that the President of the United
States has sought to establish military tribunals by an executive order for
the purpose of trying those accused of violations of the laws of war. The
last executive order, after which President Bush modeled his, was
adopted in 1942 by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to establish a
military commission to try Nazi saboteurs who were sent to the United
States to engage in terrorist acts within the United States. 34 But, there are
a number of significant differences between the two orders. Perhaps the

33

RONALD

DWORKIN,

TAKING

RIGHTS

SERIOUSLY

272-73

(1977)

(stating

that

"[g]overnment must not only treat people with concern and respect, but with equal
concern and respect").
34 See generally Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
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most important difference is that Roosevelt's Order made no distinction
between citizens and noncitizens, while that distinction is central to
Bush's Military Order. As a matter of fact, in 1942, one of the accused
saboteurs claimed, without any success, that he was a U.S. citizen and,
therefore, was entitled, under the Constitution, to a trial before an Article
35
III court rather than a military tribunal.
Why was President Bush moved to make the distinction between
citizens and noncitizens while President Roosevelt was not? One
response might be that the distinction was simply a calculated political
act. President Bush wanted to minimize political resistance to the
establishment of military tribunals, though there was no belief that
permanent residents could be any more likely to have been part of the
terrorist network that attacked the United States than citizens. It is
perhaps true that there would have been a great deal more resistance to
the idea of military tribunals had citizens been subject to their
jurisdiction. Citizens vote and have relatives that vote, and the political
cost may have been calculated to be much greater than whatever security
was to be gained by subjecting citizens to the jurisdiction of military
commissions.
In an interesting article, Jack Goldsmith and Cass Sunstein of the
University of Chicago Law School explore the issue of why there has
been strong criticism of President Bush's Military Order while there was
virtually no criticism of President Roosevelt's similar Order in 1942.36

Id. Although the Court declined to address the claimant's status as a U.S. citizen-the
issue was whether the claimant lost his U.S. citizenship because he elected to maintain
German allegiance and citizenship-it made it clear that U.S. citizenship "does not relieve
him from the consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful because in violation of the
law of war." Id. at 37.
36 Jack Goldsmith & Cass Sunstein, Military Tribunals and Legal Culture: What a Difference
Sixty Years Makes, JOHN M. OLIN LAW & ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER No. 153, 2D SERIES
(2002), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/WkngPprs-151-175/153.jg-cs.tribunals.
pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2003); see also LOUIS FISHER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
REPORT FOR CONGRESS: MILITARY TRIBUNALS: THE QUIRIN PRECEDENT 34-41 (Mar. 26, 2002).
The editorials of almost all of the major newspapers and magazines, including The New
York Times, The Washington Post and The New Republic were quite supportive of the
establishment of military tribunals. The Washington Post editorialized: "Americans can
have the satisfaction of knowing that even in a time of great national peril we did not stoop
to the practices of our enemies." Justice Is Done, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 1942, at 6. The New
York Times opined that a "fair trial for any person accused of crime ... is one of the things
we defend in this war" and did not criticize the trial by military tribunals as being
inconsistent with that commitment. They That Take the Sword, N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 9, 1942, at 8.
The base line for The New York Times was what the enemy would do if it caught American
citizens doing what the Germans were accused of doing. Id. The New Republic thought it
35
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After examining all the differences between the two orders that may
account for the different reactions that each received, including the fact
that the nation in 2001 may not have perceived a threat to its survival as
it did in 1942, the authors conclude that a major reason is the shift in
legal culture in the intervening sixty years. The shift, as they see it, is
that of the strengthening of civil liberties, especially in the post-Sixties
era, and increasing distrust of the power of government. If Goldsmith
and Sunstein are right in their observation, then it clearly explains why
President Bush's Order may have exempted citizens from tribunal
jurisdiction. But how does one explain the singling out of noncitizens,
including LPRs? I think the answer may be the development of another
parallel culture. Although the legal culture may have changed in favor
of more civil liberties and more suspicion of government, that culture is
also accompanied by an increase in anxiety about, and at times even
hostility towards, immigration and immigrants. Globalization and the
dislocation that it often entails have intensified that anxiety about the
foreign "Other," both in this and other countries. So, perhaps one
explanation for the President's desire to distinguish between citizens and
noncitizens is the recognition of the two sides of the cultural shift. A
more robust culture of rights is accompanied by a more heightened sense
of fear or anxiety about the foreign "Other."
However, this seems to me precisely the sort of political calculation
that the Constitution and political morality would view unfavorably.
Singling out a group for a special disability precisely because it lacks the
political clout will surely offend the equal protection dimension of the
Fifth Amendment and will be in violation of a reasonable understanding
of political morality. Put simply, the distinction will violate both the
constitutional and political aspects of "We the People."
It will offend the equal protection component of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment 37 because, even though the federal
government is said to have plenary power on matters of immigration, 38
"good to know that even in wartime and even toward the enemy we do not abandon our
basic protection of individual rights." The Saboteurs and the Court, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 10,
1942, at 159.
37
The Supreme Court has insisted that there is a presumption of "congruence" under
which "[elqual protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under
the Fourteenth Amendment." Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995)
(citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976)).
3
See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976) ("In the exercise of its broad power
over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be
unacceptable if applied to citizens."). The plenary power argument was first announced in
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that power is, to quote Justice Breyer in Zadvydas v. Davis, 39 "subject to
important constitutional limitation[]." 40 There are two dimensions to
this constitutional limitation. First, the power cannot be exercised
unrelated to an immigration or naturalization issue. To have plenary
power over immigration and naturalization does not mean to have
plenary power over the lives of noncitizens across a whole range of
activities. Subjecting LPRs to military commissions is not an exercise of
immigration or naturalization power. The issues for which LPRs are sent
to military tribunals have very little to do with the admission or
naturalization process.
The force of the argument becomes even stronger given the fact that
the issue of whether the Congress, the branch that has been given the
primary authority over immigration and naturalization, 41 has endorsed
the distinction is unclear at best. There is no presidential plenary power
that allows the President to distinguish among members of "We the
People" and to impose disability on one section of the community.
Even if one were to agree with the Supreme Court's decision in
Mathews v. Diaz, 42 a case where the Supreme Court sustained a federal
regulation disqualifying permanent resident aliens from participating in
the Medicare program unless they had been in the country for five years
as permanent residents (and one could reasonably disagree with the
outcome in that case), I believe that decision cannot serve as a precedent
for the distinction that is made in the Military Order. In Mathews, it was
at least plausible that Congress was regulating "the conditions of entry
...of aliens" 43 and that it is within Congress's power to ensure that
admitees are not "likely ...to become a public charge." 44 But, it would
be hard to argue that the citizen-noncitizen distinction in the Military
Order is in pursuance of any conceivable immigration or naturalization
purpose.
It is, to borrow a metaphor from dormant commerce
jurisprudence, "downstream regulation." 45
Or, is it upstream?

Ping v. United States, commonly called the Chinese Exclusion Case. 130 U.S. 581 (1889). The
plenary power argument will work only if one assumes that the President has the
authorization of Congress to establish the tribunals, an assumption that could be
reasonably challenged.
39
533 U.S. 678 (2001).
40
Id. at 695.
41
See U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8,cl. 4.
42
426 U.S. 67.
43
Id. at 84.
4
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(A) (2000).
45
See S. Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
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Alternatively, to use a description that the noted political theorist
Michael Walzer utilized in the course of developing his theory of justice,
the regulatory schemes embodied in the Order do not respect the
46
distributive autonomy of spheres.
When an issue is not one of admission or naturalization, the
Constitution conceives of "We the People" as a community of persons
rather than as a community of citizens. That is evident in the fact that
equal protection and the Bill of Rights speak to us as "the people" or as
"persons." The First, Second, and Fourth Amendments refer to the
"right of the People." Articles 1(9), 111(3), and IV(2), as well as the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments, refer to "persons."
During the congressional debate, the principal author of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Representative John Bingham, a Republican
from Ohio, asked, "Is it not essential ... that all persons, whether citizens
or strangers, within this land, shall have equal protection?" 47 One may
ask, essential for what? Essential certainly for the security of those
noncitizens in our land. But, more importantly in my view, it is essential
for the integrity and character of "We the People," for as Justice Jackson
once observed, equal protection is the most practical guarantee that
arbitrary and unreasonable government would not turn "We the People"
into a community of unequals by imposing burdens on a minority or
minorities that the government is not willing to impose, or is fearful of
imposing, on the rest of us.48 "We the People" are a unit. We are like a
drum, you hit us on one end, our whole being vibrates. We feel the
tremor. I shall have more to say on that later.
For non-immigration and non-naturalization issues, therefore, the
Constitution starts with "We the People" and ends with "persons." As I

46

MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 61-63,

303-11 (1983).
47

CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1090 (1866).

This is how Justice Jackson put it:
[T]here is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and
unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law
which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed
generally [and that] nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so
effectively as to allow those officials to pick and choose only a few to
whom they will apply legislation and thus to escape the political
retribution that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were
affected.
Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring); see
also Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 300 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
48
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noted earlier, there are exceptions to this, but those exceptions do not
undermine this general proposition.
Even if the citizen-noncitizen distinction is to be considered within
the purview of the immigration power, that power will still have to be
exercised with some degree of reasonableness. 49 There does not seem to
be any plausible reason that would justify the distinction between
citizens and LPRs for purposes of tribunal jurisdiction other than the fact
that the latter are less able to exact political cost on politicians. Clearly, if
there was any evidence that indicated that LPRs were more likely to
engage in the prohibited acts than citizens, then the distinction may be
considered reasonable.
But, in this instance, there was no such
evidence-at least none that was publicly offered. In fact, from what is
publicly available, there were some citizens, but no permanent residents,
that have been charged in connection with the September 11th terrorist
attacks. 50
Perhaps one could argue that even though there is no empirical
evidence to show that LPRs are more likely to engage in activities that
are injurious to the United States, it is not illogical to think that those
who have chosen to take an oath of loyalty to the United States and its
flag have a deeper commitment to the country and, consequently, may
be more reluctant to engage in activities that will injure it and its people.
This argument seems to me unpersuasive. First, this Order applies not
only to people who have opted not to take up citizenship though eligible
to do so, but also to those who might well have taken up citizenship if
they were eligible if the five-year waiting period was over, and perhaps
even those who have applied but have not yet gotten the approval. In
such a case, LPRs are not what Annette Baier has called "voluntary
resident aliens."5 1 Second, there are many reasons why people do not
take up citizenship, and it is not necessarily the case that it is for lack of
commitment or loyalty to the country.
In the era of increased
globalization, the very idea of citizenship may have to be recast.
Third, if oath of allegiance defines commitment, then we should be
wary of people born in this country, for they are not required to "swear

See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 83 (1976)
See, e.g., Peter Finn, Suspect's Slip Helped Police in Germany Foil Alleged Plot, WASH.
POST, Sept. 8, 2002, at A25.
51
Annette C. Baier, Some Virtues of Resident Alienage, in VIRTUE 291, 292 (John W.
Chapman & William A. Galston eds., 1992); see also Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S.
580, 585 (1952).
49
50
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allegiance to the Constitution." 52 Perhaps "[w]e assume that by virtue of
53
their birth" in the country they will remain loyal to the United States.
As the cases of John Walker Lindh and others show, this may not
necessarily be the case. 54 Even more importantly, why is it logical to
assume that people that happen to be in this country by accident of birth
will be more committed, and more loyal, to the country than those LPRs
who have made the affirmative decision to abandon their roots and to
55
move to this country?
In fact, it may be argued that even in the immigration area, where
the courts have normally deferred to the political branches of the federal
government, treating aliens, including LPRs, less favorably than citizens
on matters as fundamental as the protection of civilian justice requires
that there be a showing of more than reasonableness.
I said earlier that the distinction also offended political morality.
How does it do that? Let me first start with what I believe to be a
reasonable assumption from the point of view of political morality,
though it will be increasingly contested in the information age where
national borders are becoming speedbumps on the information
superhighway. That is, "We the People," through our elected officials,
have the right to determine who shall be a member of the community
and under what condition membership shall be granted. To be a
community is to have the power to determine the rules under which
membership to the community shall be granted. Otherwise, the very
existence of the community itself is at risk. As Michael Walzer put it,
"Admission and exclusion are at the core of communal independence.
They suggest the deepest meaning of self-determination. Without them,
there could not be communities of character."5 6 I agree. But the character
and integrity of the community will also be affected if the power over
admission is transformed into a means of imposing social disabilities on
the newcomers, turning the newcomers "into pariahs," to use Owen
Fiss's description.5 7 The Military Order, just like the welfare reform act
of the mid-1990s (which denied welfare benefits to permanent residents

52

Gordon, supra note 8, at 46.

53

Id.

54 Eric Lichtblau, Threats and Responses: The Terrorism Suspects; 4 in U.S. Charged in Post9/11 Plan to Join Al Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2002, at Al.
55 Gordon, supranote 8, at 46.
56
WALZER, supra note 46, at 62.
57 See Owen Fiss, The Immigrant as Pariah, in A COMMUNITY OF EQUALS: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF NEW AMERICANS, supra note 8, at 16.
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when they fell on hard times even though they pay taxes just like
citizens), imposes a social disability threatening the claim of "We the
People" to be a community of equals. The disability that the Military
Order imposes on LPRs, just like the welfare disability, 8 is not just a
disability on permanent residents, but, more significantly, it threatens to
undermine the nature of the community, the character of "We the
People."
In the current context, the distinction between citizens and LPRs
may also be overdetermined by other traditional markers of
subordination such as race, religion, and ethnicity. To the extent that the
fight against terrorism is generally viewed as a fight against Islamic
fundamentalists, many of whom are thought to be from the Middle East
or South and South East Asia, people who come from those parts of the
world and are Muslims are going to be especially vulnerable to being
subject to tribunal jurisdiction.
Indeed, one of the most worrying developments in the postSeptember 11th period has been the degree to which ethnic profiling has
become an almost routine measure for law enforcement authorities.5 9 In
making a distinction between citizens and noncitizens, the Military
Order both codifies and gives legitimacy to this process of ethnic
profiling. The impact of this on the character of "We the People" is of
two kinds. As I have argued earlier, the immediate impact is, of course,
the turning of some members of "We the People," who are permanent
residents, into pariahs. But, there is a second and unintended impact on
the character of the community. Despite the explicit exemption of
citizens from the jurisdiction of the military tribunals, the ethnic
profiling that is inherent in, and is endorsed by, the Order will have
some impact on the citizens as well. Citizens that "look foreign" and
from a certain area of the world will be treated as suspects by both the
public and law enforcement officials. 6° The signal that the Order sends is
much larger than the immediate impact that appears clear from the text.
As I noted earlier, "We the People" are a unit, and a strike on one corner
or segment of the unit, however localized it might have been intended to
be, will often have an impact on the entire unit. Perhaps that is why the

8 U.S.C. § 1611 (2000).
See Cole, supra note 29, at 974-77; see also David M. Halbfinger, Terror Scare in Florida:
False Alarm, But Televised, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2002, at A10.
60
See Halbfinger, supra note 59.
58
59
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Constitution is careful not to make a distinction between citizens and
noncitizens except for limited and specific purposes.
It is not just domestically that the distinction between citizens and
noncitizens will have adverse consequences. It will have an undesirable
global impact as well. First, this Order and its consequences will be
viewed as precedent by many regimes around the world to try civilians
suspected of terrorism by military commissions and tribunals, especially
citizens of other countries. I say especially citizens of other countries
because it is precisely trials of such individuals, especially if they were
from the United States, which will attract international attention. And, it
is such attention and scrutiny that secret military trials will allow
regimes to avoid. Second, the United States will not have the high moral
ground to criticize and challenge such trials. When in the mid-1990s
Peru used a military tribunal to try U.S. citizen Lori Berenson for the
terrorism-related crime of treason, the State Department characterized
her trial, quite correctly in my view, as lacking in due process and
having egregious flaws. Indeed, the State Department is on record as
having denounced the use of military tribunals to try civilians, not once,
not twice, but dozens of times.61 After November 13, 2001, that will be
increasingly difficult to do without sounding hypocritical. To be sure,
there is no guarantee that other nations will follow the United States and
not try citizens of other countries, or their own, before military tribunals
if the United States were to drop the idea of military tribunals. But,
given the unparalleled power and influence of the United States, it is
almost certain that the use of military tribunals by the United States will
be viewed as legitimizing military proceedings against foreigners,
62
including U.S. citizens abroad.
Recently, the Bush Administration reversed the commitment of the
Clinton Administration that the United States will be a signatory
member of the newly established International Criminal Court to the
dismay of many in the international community, including European
allies. One of the reasons the Administration offered was that U.S.
citizens and servicepersons around the world will be vulnerable to
politically motivated trials before the International Criminal Court.
Whatever the merit of that argument, the Military Order, and the

See supra note 26.
For a report thdt argues that governments worldwide are using September 11th as an
opportunity to restrict the freedom of their citizens as well as the freedom of others, see For
Whom the Liberty Bell Tolls, ECONOMIST, Aug. 31, 2002, at 18-20.
61
62
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tribunals it seeks to establish, will make U.S. citizens more vulnerable to
trials not by a court, such as the International Criminal Court, which will
have to function in the open, but by shadowy and secretive military
tribunals.
Third, the trial of noncitizens, including LPRs, by military tribunals
is utterly inconsistent with international norms to which the United
States has obligated itself. Article 14 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), for example, requires states to
ensure that all persons are equal before the courts and tribunals.63
Discrimination on the basis of citizenship or any other basis is
prohibited. 64 It is true that these international guarantees are subject to
suspension or derogation in time of emergency, 65 but the United States
has not taken any steps to invoke that right of derogation. Furthermore,
it is not even clear that under the ICCPR a derogation of this sort will be
allowed. 66 The actions of the United States in relation to military
tribunals are, therefore, inconsistent with the treaty commitment that it
has given to the international community.
Violations of international norms by the United States will not only
deprive the accused of their internationally guaranteed protections, but
they will, more importantly, undermine the capacity of the United States
to shape the post-Cold War world in the direction of more respect for
human rights. It is not accidental that the organic document (the
constitution) of the international community, the United Nations

63 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 14(1), 6
I.L.M. 360, 372 [hereinafter ICCPR]. The ICCPR also provides that, at the minimum, there
shall be a public hearing before an "independent and impartial tribunal established by
law" and the possibility of appealing to an independent tribunal. See id. art. 14(2)-(3), (5).
6
The action of the U.S. government is also clearly a violation of the Third Geneva
Convention of 1949, which prescribes as to how prisoners of war as well as civilians in
times of war are to be treated. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
65 Article 4(1) of the ICCPR provides for the rights of derogation as follows: Rights may
be suspended only "[i]n time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation."
ICCPR, supra note 63, art. 4(1). Although, it could be argued that what happened on
September 11th created an emergency, especially at the earlier moments when the nature of
the extent of the threat and the identity of the attackers were unknown, it would be hard to
argue that a permanent risk of international terrorism which the United States will fight
will meet the threshold of "an emergency which threatens the life of the nation." Id. art.
4(1).
6
Article 4(1) provides that derogation may not be applied in a manner that
discriminates on the basis of, among other things, race, color, and religion. ICCPR, supra
note 63, art. 4(1); see also id. art. 4(2).
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Charter, opens with the same phrase as that of the United States
Constitution: "We the People of the United Nations." 67 The influence of
the United States on the international community has been evident from
the very beginning, from the very framing of the United Nations
Charter.
Given the fact that currently the United States is the
unchallenged global power, the capacity of "We the People of the United
States" to help shape the community of "We the People of the United
Nations" in the direction of more respect for human rights is very
significant. However, the proposed military tribunals and the distinction
they make between citizens and noncitizens undercut that capacity.
V.
As authorized by the Military Order, in March of this year, the
Secretary of Defense promulgated the rules to govern the conduct of the
trials before the military commissions. The rules appear to minimize
The
some of the harshest aspects of the initial Military Order.
presumption of innocence will apply, as well as the usual criminal
Now there is a
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
requirement that there be unanimity among the members of the tribunal
to impose the death penalty, rather than the two-thirds majority that the
initial Military Order provided. Some aspects of the evidentiary rules
are modified, but these modifications do not deal with the central issue
of this lecture. Noncitizens who are accused of terrorism will be subject
to the exclusive jurisdiction of military tribunals.
The Military Order affects "We the People" negatively in two ways.
It undermines our commitment to constitute a community of equals
internally, and it undercuts our moral authority to help shape an
international community that is defined by its respect for human rights.
It is how we act in times of anxiety and tension and in relation to the
most vulnerable group within the body of "We the People" that will
define the character of our community and the extent of our influence
abroad. As the New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman aptly put it:
American leadership may at times require American valor, "but it is
ultimately based on American values." 68 We should not allow these
times of anxiety and vulnerability to shake our commitment to those
values.

67

U.N. CHARTER pmbl.

Thomas L. Friedman, Why the World Listens When We Speak, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 17,
2002, at B5.
68
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There have been times in the history of this country when anxieties
and tensions have led to hostilities towards aliens (or citizens that are
considered aliens) within the country. In some circumstances, those
hostilities led to political and legal actions that we have regretted. By
making a distinction between noncitizens and citizens in the Military
Order, for the purpose of establishing the jurisdiction of military
tribunals, President Bush unfortunately lends support to, or associates
himself with, that part of our tradition.69 The cost of the Military Order's
distinction between citizens and noncitizens is not only unfair to those
who are subjected to harsher treatment by virtue of belonging to a
vulnerable group, but it is also unfair to the character and identity of the
community we seek to build, a community of equals. It is far from
certain that we will purchase any degree of security with the high cost
that we will be paying by turning some members of "We the People"
into pariahs and by setting a precedent that will negatively affect our
capacity to influence the constitution of a decent international
community.
Responding to critics of some aspects of the Administration's policy
in relation to civil liberties, Attorney General John Ashcroft accused the
critics of aiding and abetting our enemies by eroding our national unity
and diminishing our resolve in the war against terrorism. Ashcroft
stated:
To those who pit Americans against immigrants and
citizens against non-citizens, those who scare peaceloving people with phantoms of lost liberty, my message
is this: Your tactics only aid terrorists, for they erode
our national unity and diminish our resolve. They give
ammunition to America's enemies, and pause to
70
America's friends.
I think the Attorney General gets it wrong. It is in fact some aspects
of the Administration's policy of the war against terrorism that threaten
to erode our national unity and the cohesiveness of "We the People," by
making an unconstitutional and, in my view, ill-advised distinction
between citizens and noncitizens, a distinction that is of dubious utility
to the security of the nation. It is not the critics that give aid and comfort

69 See Aryeh Neier, The Military Tribunalson Trial, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 14, 2002, at 12.
70 Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Anti-Terrorism Policy, 107th Cong. 313 (2001)
(testimony of Attorney General John Ashcroft).
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to our enemies, but rather it is those who would discard or otherwise
compromise the principles that define "We the People" who will play
into the hands of our enemies and give pose to our friends.
The President would honor and reaffirm the central commitment of
this nation to constitute a community of equals by withdrawing
jurisdiction of the military tribunals over LPRs and, even better, by
abandoning the idea of military tribunals altogether. The federal courts
will try these cases as efficiently and as fairly as they have done in the
past when terrorist suspects came before them.
There are hopeful signs that perhaps the military tribunals will not
come into being if the trials of Zaccarias Moussaoui, the French citizen
who is accused of being one of the September 11th plotters, and Richard
Reid, the sneaker bomber, are any indication. Both men are being tried
before the federal courts, not a military tribunal. But, one can never be
sure as long as the law remains in the books. 71 In any case, even if the
tribunals were never to sit at all, the existence of a law that explicitly
makes a distinction between citizens and noncitizens and gives the
accuser the final word will continue to send an undesirable signal both at
home and abroad, making it that much more difficult for "We the
People" to constitute a community of equals and to make the post-Cold
War world congenial to human rights and the rule of law. 72

In fact, a couple of weeks after this lecture was delivered, The New York Times carried
an article that detailed an apparent discussion within the Administration on the subject of
whether to abort the Justice Department's prosecution of Zacarias Moussaoui in a federal
court and to move his case to a military tribunal. This clearly suggests that we have not
heard the last of military tribunals. See Philip Shenon & Eric Schmitt, Threats and Responses,
the 9/11 Supsects; White House Weighs Letting Military Tribunal Try Moussaoui, Officials Say,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 10, 2002, § 1, at 17.
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The President is both the accuser and the individual to whom the accused will make
his or her final appeal. See Military Order, supra note 12, §§ 2, 4(c)(8).
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